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THE “ESPECIALLY HEINOUS”
AGGRAVATOR: SHARPSHOOTER BONUSES
DO NOT BELONG IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING LAW
TAYLOR LOPA†
INTRODUCTION
In capital cases, the jury is often left with the onerous
decision about whether to impose the death penalty. To help
jurors make sentencing decisions, judges will instruct them on
how to apply the law. As one juror summarized, “[The judge told
us] that we were to make our decision on the basis of his
instructions and the law, not what we felt, not what we thought
ought to be.”1 Because of jury instructions like this, jurors know
that they must base sentencing decisions on the law rather than
their personal beliefs. But what happens when the law itself
leaves jurors to make decisions about who lives or dies based on
the sentencers’ subjective beliefs?
Fortunately, states that allow capital punishment have
statutes outlining circumstances that sentencers must find
present before they can choose to sentence the defendant to
death.2
Usually, these statutes specify aggravating
circumstances that, according to the legislature, set capital
murder apart from normal first-degree murder cases.3 One type
of aggravating circumstance, however, asks the jury to take part
in that determination.
Specifically, this aggravating
circumstance allows jurors to impose the death penalty if they
determine “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.”4 This aggravating factor is controversial because, unlike
†
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1
Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs—Capital Jurors Who Change Their Minds About
the Punishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L. J. 1183, 1214
(1995) (alteration in original).
2
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (2013).
3
§ 701.12.
4
§ 701.12(4).
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most, the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”)
aggravator does not measurably narrow the class of people
eligible for capital punishment. Because the HAC aggravator is
vague and essentially asks ordinary people to determine whether
an unjustified killing is “particularly bad,” a juror could find that
any murder meets this standard.5
While the aggravating circumstance is designed to cover only
the most deserving defendants, the standard erroneously
assumes that average jurors know how to distinguish capital
murders from all others.6 In reality, unbridled sentencing
discretion invites jurors to base life and death decisions on their
subjective judgments.7
Thus, limitless jury discretion has
historically led to the “arbitrary and capricious” infliction of the
death penalty, which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.8 To provide objective standards
that guide the jury’s decision about whether the crime justifies
the death sentence, state courts have adopted limiting
constructions of their states’ HAC aggravators.9 Despite this
judicial intervention, HAC aggravators still fail to sufficiently
limit jury discretion.10 Oklahoma’s aggravator is no exception.11
This Note argues that HAC aggravators, like Oklahoma’s,
are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. Part I of this Note
discusses Supreme Court precedent regarding capital sentencing
and the HAC aggravating circumstance. Part II addresses the
implications of this Supreme Court precedent, including how it
applies to Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator. Oklahoma case law
confirms what common sense would suggest about the state’s
court-made limiting construction: The construction hardly and
arbitrarily limits the application of the HAC factor, which
continues to apply in an unprincipled, overly broad manner. Part
III argues that, as the Oklahoma courts’ limiting construction
5

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988).
Michael Welner et al., The Depravity Standard I: An Introduction, 55 J. CRIM.
JUST. 1, 3 (2018).
7
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980).
8
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9
Chad Flanders, Is Having Too Many Aggravating Factors the Same as Having
None at All?: A Comment on the Hidalgo Cert. Petition, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 55
(2017).
10
Welner et al., supra note 6, at 5.
11
Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001); Wayne L. Shelley,
Influences and Effects of Subjective Post-Furman Death-Penalty Aggravators on
Oklahoma Death Penalty Cases 93 (2014) (Ph.D. dissertation, Capella University)
(on file with author).
6
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currently applies, the state’s HAC aggravator wholly fails to
target “especially heinous” murders. To meet constitutional
standards, these aggravators must cue jurors into specific
circumstances that elevate a murder above those that fit the
“typical” profile. As the political branch entrusted with the
responsibility to craft criminal statutes that law enforcement and
sentencers can fairly apply to individual defendants, the
legislature—not the judiciary—is the appropriate body to reform
the HAC aggravator.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN STATE CAPITAL
SENTENCING LAW
States did not always have safeguards to ensure jurors
reserved the death penalty for only the “truly deserving”
defendants.12
Without adequate jury guidance, whether a
defendant lives or dies often hinges on the mental state of the
specific jury members rather than the circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s conduct.13 For example, jurors
might inject improper prejudices into their evaluations or base
their decision on irrelevant or arbitrary factors.14 In 1972, the
Supreme Court, concerned about these risks, tasked states with
the responsibility to regulate juries’ capital sentencing
decisions.15
A.

In 1972, the Supreme Court mandated statutory standards in
capital cases, which led states to create the HAC aggravator.

In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court recognized that
unfettered jury discretion leads to the “arbitrary” and
“capricious” infliction of the death penalty.16 Though there was
no majority opinion, five justices held that the imposition of the
death penalty in the cases at issue violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.17
Two justices would have found the death penalty
12
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (“To identify before the
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for
the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be
fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.”).
13
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White, J. concurring).
14
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J. concurring).
15
Id. at 239–40 (per curiam).
16
Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17
Id. at 239–40.
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unconstitutional per se.18 Contrarily, three justices argued that
capital punishment is unconstitutional only in the absence of
rational and discernible standards that distinguish murders that
qualify for the death penalty from those that do not.19
Post-Furman, states had to pass legislation to guide jury
sentencing if they wanted to preserve capital punishment.20 One
approach21 states took was to enact statutes that require juries to
find at least one of a list of aggravating factors present before
they may subject a defendant to the death penalty.22 Four years
later, the Supreme Court upheld this sentencing scheme.23 In
Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that “a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is
given adequate information and guidance” can prevent the
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.24
Additionally, the Court in Gregg, for the first time, analyzed
whether an HAC aggravator provided the necessary level of juror
guidance.25 This gap-filling aggravating circumstance allows the
jury to impose the death penalty if it finds the nature and
surrounding circumstances of a murder were somehow more
troubling than those of a “typical” murder.26 In Georgia, this
aggravator allowed capital sentencing if the jury found the
murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated
battery to the victim.”27 While the majority conceded that “any
murder [arguably] involves depravity of mind or an aggravated
battery,” it refused to find the aggravator overly vague and broad

18

Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
314 (White, J., concurring).
20
Richard A. Rosen, The Especially Heinous Aggravating Circumstance in
Capital Cases—The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 947 (1986).
21
The other approach states took was to completely remove the jury’s discretion
if the murder satisfied certain circumstances. Id. at 947. Under these circumstances,
the death penalty would be mandatory. Id. The Supreme Court struck down this
sentencing scheme in 1976. Id.
22
Id. at 948. Generally, these aggravators are bright-line circumstances, like
“[t]he victim of the murder was a peace officer,” or “[t]he defendant was previously
convicted of a [violent] felony” against the victim. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12.
23
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
24
Id. at 195.
25
Id. at 200-01.
26
See id. at 198; Welner et al., supra note 6, at 1.
27
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102(b)(7) (1975)
(recodified as GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2017))).
19
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because the Georgia Supreme Court could construe the
aggravator narrowly.28
In rejecting a statutory construction that allows the jury to
impose the death penalty in any first-degree murder case, Gregg
supported Justice White’s proposition in Furman that there must
be a “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which
[the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.”29 Nevertheless, this decision permitted states’ highest
courts to adopt saving constructions, which narrowly interpret
statutory aggravators that do not sufficiently limit jury
discretion.30
B. In line with its precedent requiring capital sentencing
standards, in 1980, the Court began to strike down overly
vague and broad HAC aggravators.
Four years after Gregg, the Supreme Court again considered
Georgia’s especially heinous aggravator in Godfrey v. Georgia.31
This time, the Court struck down the aggravator, finding it to be
overly broad and vague.32 Thus, the Court enforced the Furman
principle that states must restrain juries’ discretion to prevent
the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.33 In
his plurality opinion, Justice Stewart noted that states have a
responsibility to “channel the sentencer’s discretion by ‘clear and
objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance,’
and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death.’ ”34 Since rational jurors could reasonably
believe that virtually every murder is “outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible and inhuman,” the Georgia statute was too
ambiguous to pass constitutional muster.35 However, the Court
reiterated Gregg’s suggestion that state courts could adopt a
narrowing construction of vague statutory language.36 Indeed,
28

Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
30
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201.
31
446 U.S. 420 (1980).
32
Id. at 422, 433.
33
Id. at 428 (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a
constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”).
34
Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,
253 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976)).
35
Id. at 428–29 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102(b)(7) (1975) (recodified as GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (2017))).
36
Id. at 432.
29
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the Court would have upheld Godfrey’s conviction if, in that case,
the Georgia Supreme Court applied the more stringent criteria
that it had applied to other cases.37 Therefore, Godfrey effectively
obligated state courts to extract discernable meanings from HAC
aggravators to cure their potentially limitless application in firstdegree murder cases.
In Maynard v. Cartwright (1988), because Oklahoma had a
similarly ambiguous aggravator but failed to limit its application,
the Supreme Court applied Godfrey to the state’s “especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” circumstance.38 Like in Godfrey, the
Court held that Oklahoma applied an unconstitutionally vague
construction because, although the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (“OCCA”) had established an adequate limiting
construction, it had not required the state to apply it until after
Maynard’s conviction.39 Here, the Court signaled that the
aggravator would meet constitutional requirements if the OCCA
continued to restrict the HAC aggravating circumstance to
murders that included “torture or serious physical abuse.”40
Although the Court did not discuss them, in Maynard’s case,
the judge provided the jury with capital sentencing instructions,41
which the Oklahoma courts uniformly use today.42 The state
defined heinous as “extremely wicked or shockingly evil,”
atrocious as “outrageously wicked and vile,” and cruel as
“pitiless,” or “designed to inflict a high degree of pain,” with
“utter indifference to, or [even] enjoyment of, the suffering of
others.”43
Tacitly, in suggesting a court-made narrowing
construction, the Court concluded that the definitional
sentencing instructions Oklahoma courts used in Maynard’s case
were insufficient to cure the aggravator’s lack of guidance.44
37
See William S. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s
Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 753
(1985).
38
486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (2011)).
39
Id. at 364–65; see Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 563 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987).
In Proffitt v. Florida, the Supreme Court had held that the Florida Supreme Court’s
limiting construction, which contained a torture requirement, was not
unconstitutionally vague. 428 U.S. at 255–56. After Maynard, the OCCA adopted
that limiting construction. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995).
40
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
41
Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (10th Cir. 1987).
42
DeRosa v. State, 89 P.3d 1124, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
43
Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1488–89.
44
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363–65. While this decision did not specifically analyze
Oklahoma’s jury instructions, the Court noted that Godfrey’s sentencing instructions
gave the jury “no guidance” about what the terms meant shortly before affirming the
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These instructions were no better than the HAC aggravator
alone because they merely defined vague terms through
additional vague terms.45 Still, the Court was careful to note
that there could be other constitutionally acceptable limiting
constructions that the Oklahoma courts could apply to the HAC
aggravator.46 Essentially, this case further encouraged state
appellate courts to take an active role in refining HAC
aggravators that fail to clarify which manners of killing are
“especially heinous.”47
Taking this cue, the Oklahoma courts returned to the
“torture . . . or serious physical abuse” limiting construction
following the Court’s decision in Maynard.48 Therefore, the jury
could find the especially heinous factor present only if it found
evidence of torture or serious physical abuse preceding the
victim’s death.49 Specifically, the courts limit murders containing
torture or serious physical abuse to those where the defendant
inflicts “great physical anguish” or “extreme mental cruelty.”50
As a second step, the judge provides the jury with instructions to
define each term in the HAC aggravator.51 With this guidance,
the jury could then consider the surrounding circumstances to
determine whether the murder was “especially heinous.”
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA’S HAC
On its face, the current Oklahoma standard seems to limit
jury discretion since most people can conceptualize extreme pain,
whether physical or emotional. However, the OCCA has defined
“great physical anguish” and “extreme mental cruelty” much
more broadly than the plain language would suggest. The great
physical anguish standard is satisfied if the victim experienced
lower court’s decision that Godrey controlled. Id. at 363–64. The lower court had
previously addressed this issue specifically and held that the definitions were not an
adequate limiting construction because they closely resembled the language rejected
in Godfrey. Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1489.
45
Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1489; see Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363–64. Notably,
because the HAC aggravator is written in the disjunctive, the lower court rejected
the state’s argument that the definition of “cruel” was sufficiently clear. Cartwright,
822 F.2d at 1489–90.
46
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
47
Id. at 364–65.
48
Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995).
49
Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672, 674 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
50
Medlock v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1314, 1324 (10th Cir. 2000) (Lucero, J., concurring)
(quoting Cheney v. State, 909 P.2d 74, 80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)).
51
Nuckols, 805 P.2d at 674.
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“conscious physical suffering” before death.52 And the mental
cruelty standard is met if the torture caused the victim greater
mental anguish than the underlying killing would necessarily
cause.53 In practice, this narrowing construction limits the death
penalty to cases where the murder victim experiences some pain
before losing consciousness.54 Thus, any murder satisfies the
HAC aggravator unless the defendant strikes the victim with an
instantaneously fatal blow.
Unlike Oklahoma’s pre-Maynard aggravator, the limiting
construction is easy to articulate. However, yet again, nearly any
murder is subject to the death penalty under Oklahoma’s
especially heinous circumstance.55
Moreover, when the
aggravator does exclude murders from capital punishment, it
often does so arbitrarily.56 Indeed, many murders fall outside of
the aggravator’s scope only by chance, independent of the
defendant’s intent, conduct, or level of culpability.57 Thus, two
defendants who engage in the same conduct—like shooting and
killing a victim—may have different outcomes depending on
whether the bullet happens to hit a vital part of the victim’s
body.58 This “sharpshooter bonus” is not only illogical, but also
precisely presents the constitutional issues in capital sentencing
that Furman, Godfrey, and Maynard sought to prevent.59
A.

Supreme Court precedent outlines discernable standards to
help states provide jurors with adequate guidance in capital
sentencing.

The Furman line of cases asserts two main principles
governing standards for capital sentencing. First, in capital
52

Battenfield v. Oklahoma, 816 P.2d 555, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
Berget v. State, 824 P.2d 364, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Note that the
mental and physical suffering prongs operate in the disjunctive, meaning only one
must be present for a finding of torture. Medlock, 200 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Cheney,
909 P.2d at 80). Consequently, the courts rarely focus primarily on the mental
suffering element since conscious physical suffering is present in almost any
murder. See infra Part II and accompanying footnotes.
54
Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 936 (10th Cir. 2019) (Hartz, J. dissenting).
Here, the OCCA agreed with the State that the torture prong is satisfied where the
victim does not die instantaneously. See Brief of Members of the Oklahoma Death
Penalty Review Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Pavatt v.
Sharp, 140 S. Ct. 958 (2020) (No. 19-697).
55
Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 936.
56
Id.
57
Shelley, supra note 11, at 93; see Welner et al., supra note 6, at 3.
58
Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 936.
59
Id.
53

2022]

THE “ESPECIALLY HEINOUS” AGGRAVATOR

225

cases, states have to guide sentencers through objective
measures because unfettered jury discretion leads to the
inconsistent and unpredictable application of the death penalty.60
Arbitrary outcomes are troubling because retribution should
reflect society’s judgment about what conduct warrants that
punishment rather than the jury’s individual biases or subjective
beliefs.61 Second, and relatedly, those objective standards must
provide a rational basis for distinguishing murders that are
subject to the death penalty from other first-degree murders.62
Otherwise, sentencing decisions will not reflect the state’s
assessment about which murders society considers particularly
deserving of punishment.63
Because of these recognized
principles, overbroad or excessively vague death penalty statutes
are unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.64
1.

HAC aggravators defined only in abstract terms render an
aggravator ineffective.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested that the main
issue with the HAC aggravator is that it defines aggravating
circumstances through nothing more than a series of adjectives.65
Since descriptive words are indefinite and relative, their
meanings are open to a juror’s subjective beliefs and
interpretations.66 This is especially problematic with the HAC
aggravator since it essentially asks jurors to determine if they
believe a given murder is especially repulsive and immoral
compared to others. But since society considers murder one of
the worst acts a person can commit against another, many jurors
will likely consider any murder heinous, atrocious, and cruel.67
Often, in death penalty cases, all the jury has to decide is
whether a particular murder was sufficiently more heinous,
atrocious, or cruel than the average murder. However, since
60

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877–79 (1983).
Id.; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, 197–98 (1976).
62
Zant, 462 U.S. at 878–79.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (discussing the
“outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” aggravator and concluding,
“[t]here is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that implies any inherent
restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence.”).
66
Rosen, supra note 20, at 968.
67
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594, 598 (1977). This is based on public
opinion and the Court’s own judgment (setting murder apart from crimes, including
rape, where the defendant “does not take human life”). Id. at 594, 598.
61
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“especially” modifies terms that establish no standard, that
qualifier does not limit the aggravator’s application to any
definable degree.68 As the majority in Maynard noted, “To say
that something is ‘especially heinous’ merely suggests that the
individual jurors should determine that the murder is more than
just ‘heinous,’ whatever that means, and an ordinary person
could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking
of human life is ‘especially heinous.’ ”69 The same is true of the
definitions provided in the jury instructions, which failed to
sufficiently limit the HAC aggravator since those terms, like
those they define, are synonymous with “unusually bad.”70
Because Maynard did not find these adjective-based
definitions sufficient to cure the HAC aggravator’s vagueness,
the Court implicitly confirmed that descriptive words alone do
not adequately guide the jury.71 Rather, HAC aggravators must
indicate the circumstances under which a jury can find a killing
especially heinous.72 Here, the Court seemed to accept the
torture limiting construction because, on its face, “torture or
serious physical abuse” provides a clear, objective prerequisite for
jurors to conclude that a murder is especially heinous.73 Thus,
Maynard initially solved the issue that abstract verbiage
presented in the application of legislative guidance for capital
sentencing.74 However, the Oklahoma courts have weakened the
torture prerequisite into a pseudo-standard, meaning that the
courts will find the torture element met in “almost every
murder.”75 Because the aggravator serves no narrowing function,
jury determinations are based wholly on the jurors’ subjective
judgments rather than their honest application of the HAC
aggravator to the individual case.

68

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988).
Id. at 364 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1988)).
70
See id. at 363 (citing Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1988)).
71
See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 365.
72
Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987).
73
See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364–65.
74
Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001); Pavatt v. Carpenter,
928 F.3d 906, 936–37 (10th Cir. 2019) (Hartz, J., dissenting).
75
Romano, 239 F.3d at 1176 (noting that the OCCA has blended the torture and
conscious suffering concepts).
69
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Because they must objectively narrow the class of people
eligible for the death penalty, HAC aggravators cannot apply
to the “typical” murder.

Sweeping standards are unconstitutional because, to
meaningfully guide sentencing decisions, “an aggravating
circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty.”76 Though the Atkins decision did not deal
with HAC aggravators, it highlighted the central problem with
overbroad aggravators.77 There, the Supreme Court interpreted
Godfrey as holding that “the culpability of the average murderer
is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction available to
the State.”78 This principle illustrates that Oklahoma’s limiting
construction ignores the fundamental purpose of the HAC
aggravator and capital sentencing aggravators generally. As the
name suggests, aggravators authorize the death penalty if the
defendant’s background or conduct justifies more severe
punishment than others who commit murder.79 Necessarily, the
average murder cannot satisfy this standard.
That only
“especially heinous” murders qualify for capital sentencing shows
that the legislature understands that the death penalty cannot
apply to “ordinary” murders.80 Rather, the plain language of the
HAC aggravator seems to mirror Atkins’s judgment that “only
the most deserving of execution” should be put to death.81
Ironically, precisely because of their language, HAC
aggravators are susceptible to the gratuitous infliction of the
death penalty. Unlike others, the HAC aggravator does not spell
out a circumstance that the legislature determined condemnable
enough to warrant the highest punishment under the law.82
Rather, the aggravating circumstance is whatever circumstances
surrounding the murder the jurors find to constitute an
“especially . . . aggravating circumstance”83
Inherently, HAC
aggravators are redundant because they merely echo the purpose
of an aggravating factor. Thus, without additional guiding
language, the HAC aggravator is an empty phrase and, therefore,
76

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).
78
Id.
79
JOHN E. DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION MANUAL: A STANDARD
SySTEM FOR INVESTIGATING AND CLASSIFYING VIOLENT CRIME 98–99 (3d ed. 2013).
80
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (2011).
81
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
82
Rosen, supra note 20, at 941–43.
83
Id. at 945.
77
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a “catch-all” for any murder a juror might think is deserving of
the death penalty.84
Even with Oklahoma’s current limiting construction, the
state’s HAC aggravator still, in reality, operates as a catch-all.
The Oklahoma courts instruct jurors that they can find the
defendant tortured the victim as long as they find the victim
consciously suffered before death.85 Since the vast majority of
cases satisfy that prong, the jury will almost always consider
whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
And since the latter half of the HAC jury instructions have not
changed, Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator applies almost exactly as
it did pre-Maynard.86 Despite the Furman line of cases holdings
that overbroad aggravators are unconstitutional, the courts
continue to hold that Oklahoma’s aggravator meets
constitutional standards.87
Interestingly, the Oklahoma courts take for granted that its
HAC aggravator satisfies the Eighth Amendment because the
OCCA has established a detailed test as a prerequisite to its
application.88 Generally, the court rejects vagueness challenges
to the state’s HAC aggravator under two bases. First, the OCCA
concludes that the aggravator must give sufficient guidance
because, as the Supreme Court suggested, the state uses a
“torture or serious physical abuse” limiting construction.89 The
court implicitly treats the subsequent “clarifications” of these two
terms as consistent with their plain meaning and, therefore, will
assume that the lower court’s application of the aggravator “was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application” of Maynard.90
Second, the court engages in a convoluted, yet uncritical, test to
extract facts that support a finding of “torture” and ultimately
determine that the jury could find the murder was especially
heinous.91 In short, the OCCA changed the definition of “torture”
into “conscious physical suffering” and applies this diluted
84

Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 936 (2019) (Hartz, J., dissenting).
2 OKLA. UNIF. JURY INST. CRIM. § 4-73 (OKLA. CRIM. APP. CT. 2005).
86
Id.
87
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Sharp, 798 F. App’x 183, 192–93 (10th Cir. 2019).
88
Id.
89
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 235 P.3d 640, 664 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010))
(rejecting that the HAC aggravator is vague simply because courts have approved
the limiting construction, but ignoring that the current jury instructions, which the
OCCA promulgated in DeRosa, require only conscious physical suffering to satisfy
the torture prong).
90
Id. at 191–92.
91
See, e.g., Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 920–22 (10th Cir. 2019).
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standard to particular cases, but simultaneously insists that the
narrowing construction is constitutional because it incorporates a
torture requirement.
Granted, at first, it seemed like the OCCA added to the
torture prong to clarify the standard for the jury.92 Yet, because
the OCCA placed a largely empty prerequisite in front of the
especially heinous aggravator, the court eventually crafted a jury
instruction that might as well have repealed the torture
requirement altogether.93 Today, Oklahoma’s jury instructions
implicitly provide the jury with nearly limitless discretion. That
the courts chose to make this instruction in a roundabout way
makes the standard no less sweeping.
3.

HAC factors must create principled standards, which
rationally distinguish qualifying and non-qualifying types of
murders.

Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Furman aptly
articulates why the risk of the arbitrary and capricious infliction
of the death penalty is cruel and unusual: two people who
committed the same crime, under the same circumstances, might
suffer entirely different fates.94 He submitted, “These death
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. . . . [T]he petitioners are
among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”95 Indeed, to mitigate
the possibility of the random infliction of the death penalty, the
Supreme Court has required a principled distinction between
circumstances that warrant capital sentencing from those that do
not.96 In other words, an articulable distinction between types of
murders is insufficient if that distinction does not cure the
tendency for random applications of the death penalty.
Additionally, these distinctions must also be rational, meaning
that the aggravating circumstances objectively relate to a
judgment about the defendant’s level of culpability.97
Unprincipled aggravators are often overbroad, like
Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator, but even clear standards, like the
92
93
94
95
96
97

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365 (1988).
DeRosa v. State, 89 P.3d 1124, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972).
Id.
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363.
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876–77 (1983).
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torture prerequisite, are unconstitutionally vague if they make
unhelpful distinctions.98 For example, in Maynard, the majority
explained that vagueness challenges under the Eighth
Amendment “characteristically assert that the challenged
provision fails . . . to inform juries what they must find to impose
the death penalty.”99 If the Eighth Amendment only required
instructions that adequately inform the jury of what it must find,
then Oklahoma’s aggravator might be constitutional.100
However, the Supreme Court has clarified that definable,
unprincipled standards are still vague because “open-ended
discretion” welcomes “a pattern of arbitrary and capricious
sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman.”101
Unfortunately, the current standard in Oklahoma does not
reasonably separate murders that satisfy the aggravator from
those that do not. In fact, Oklahoma appellate courts frequently
focus on largely arbitrary considerations.102
These include
whether the victim lost consciousness immediately, whether the
victim survived for a few seconds or a few minutes, and whether
the victim happened to see the attacker administer the deadly
blow.103 Often, those factors are matters of chance and unrelated
to the defendant’s intended conduct beyond inflicting a fatal
wound to the victim.104 For instance, it is hard to understand
why whether a victim happened to notice the shooter’s presence
should determine whether the defendant committed torture.105
Worse, since almost any murder meets the requirements of
the court-made limiting construction, and the second prong has
not changed, jurors can still impart their subjective standards on
the HAC aggravator.106
Exactly like before Maynard, the
heinous, atrocious, and cruel prong asks jurors to determine if
the circumstances surrounding a murder are distasteful enough
98
Id. (stating legislative guidance that fails to narrow and reasonably
distinguish those who are deserving of the death penalty from those who are not is
unconstitutionally vague).
99
Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361–62.
100
See id.
101
Id.; Zant, 462 U.S. at 876–77 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195
n.46 (1976)).
102
Shelley, supra note 11, at 93.
103
See, e.g., Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 919 (10th Cir. 2019).
104
Shelley, supra note 11, at 93; DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 97.
105
See Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 919 (highlighting that the victim clutched a trash bag
before he died because it indicated that the victim saw the plaintiff pointing a gun
before he pulled the trigger).
106
Id. at 936 (Hartz, J. dissenting).
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to warrant the defendant’s death. As the Cartwright court noted,
“When the sentencer is free to rely upon any particular event
that it believes makes a murder ‘especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel,’ the meaning that the sentencer attached to this provision
‘can only be the subject of sheer speculation.’ ”107 Regrettably, it
seems that the courts have forgotten why the state must demark
aggravating circumstances: to limit the application of the death
penalty to defendants whose conduct meets objective,
aggravating criteria.108
Oklahoma’s aggravator, with its narrowing construction,
establishes the lowest bar for a jury to find the HAC aggravator
present. Yet, the jury instructions wholly fail to indicate when
the jury should sentence a defendant to death. Indeed, the
current jury instructions grant jurors with almost limitless
discretion once they determine that the victim consciously
suffered before death.109 Instead, the instructions should require
jurors to compare an individual murder to the “larger universe of
comparable crimes.”110 Because they do not, the reviewing court
often cannot “reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder.”111
That Oklahoma cannot rationalize the state’s
sentencing decisions indicates that they are based on subjective,
or otherwise arbitrary considerations, rather than jurors’ faithful
application of the law.
B. A review of Oklahoma case law demonstrates how, under the
HAC aggravator, state courts have sanctioned arbitrary jury
determinations.
Unsurprisingly, a comparison of the cases where the
Oklahoma courts upheld jury determinations that a murder was
especially heinous yields a hopelessly conflicting image.112 Since
the sentencer can consider any circumstance it finds relevant, it
is impossible to discern any standard for finding the HAC

107

Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980)).
108
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197–98 (1976).
109
2 OKLA. UNIF. JURY INST. CRIM. § 4-73 (OKLA. CRIM. APP. CT. 2005).
110
Welner et al., supra note 6, at 9.
111
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
112
Rosen, supra note 20, at 986 (comparing eleven states’ court decisions
regarding their HAC aggravators, including Oklahoma’s); Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928
F.3d 906, 936 (10th Cir. 2019).
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aggravator present other than whether “the reviewing courts
have been able to find something disturbing in each case.”113
The dissent in Cartwright referenced this tendency, noting
that courts with similar aggravating circumstances have often
relied on contradictory factors between cases.114 For example, the
Oklahoma courts could reasonably articulate their standard for
evaluating the defendant’s motive as follows: “If the defendant
killed for no reason, the murder is especially heinous, as is a
murder committed for a reason the appellate court does not
like.”115 Indeed, the OCCA has upheld findings that a murder
was especially heinous where the defendant killed the victim “to
drive his car,”116 for “talking shit,”117 and “to wrest control of his
life insurance” for himself and the victim’s wife.118 So the HAC
aggravating factor, along with its definitions, invites juries to
rely on aggravating factors in an inconsistent manner and the
reviewing courts to simply divine which factors jurors might have
found especially heinous.119
In an equally unprincipled manner, the torture limiting
construction to the HAC aggravator directs the jury almost
exclusively toward the victim’s pain rather than the defendant’s
conduct in the victim’s final moments.120 Frequently, this
translates to an in-depth analysis of the length of time that a
victim remained conscious or survived.121 Recently, the OCCA
upheld a finding that a murder was especially heinous in a case
where the medical examiner testified that the victim would have
lost consciousness before he died and could not say whether the
victim survived for less than one minute or for up to six
minutes.122 This testimony suggests that the victim could have
lost consciousness immediately and then died only seconds later.
Therefore, the court effectively held it was reasonable to conclude
that the defendant tortured the victim even though the expert

113

Rosen, supra note 20, at 989.
Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Richard A. Rosen, The Especially Heinous Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases—The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 989 (1986)).
115
Id.
116
Berget v. State, 824 P.2d 364, 374 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
117
Robinson v. State, 900 P.2d 389, 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
118
Pavatt v. Carpenter, 928 F.3d 906, 919 (10th Cir. 2019).
119
See id. at 919–21; Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1491.
120
Shelley, supra note 11, at 93; DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 97.
121
See, e.g., Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 919–21.
122
Id. at 920–21.
114

2022]

THE “ESPECIALLY HEINOUS” AGGRAVATOR

233

did not know whether the victim experienced any pain before
death.123
If there was any doubt that Oklahoma’s current conception
of the HAC aggravator might violate the Eighth Amendment, the
court previously found the aggravator was not present in a
similar case.124 In Brown v. State, because the medical examiner
testified that the victim would have died within minutes of
receiving the fatal wounds, the court was not satisfied that the
defendant tortured the victim.125 Interestingly, in Brown, the
defendant shot his wife seven times,126 whereas in Pavatt, the
defendant shot his lover’s husband twice,127 and both died
minutes after sustaining their injuries. What makes the latter
case more pitiless is subject to “sheer speculation.”128
These cases show that Oklahoma’s limiting construction fails
to narrow the number of murders that qualify for the death
penalty or provide a principled distinction between murders that
are and are not eligible for this punishment.129 Further, the
courts have applied the limiting construction in cases where the
circumstances barely meet Oklahoma’s extremely low bar for a
finding of torture.130 Inexplicably, the jury can find that torture
or serious physical abuse accompanied a murder even without
concrete evidence that the victim genuinely suffered before
death. Once the jurors make that finding, they can rely on any
circumstance they deem relevant to determining whether the
murder was especially heinous, cruel, or atrocious. If even the
criminal courts cannot make principled decisions, how can we
expect jurors—who have less exposure to serious criminal
cases—to do so?131 Jurors play an important role as the
defendant’s peers, but they need the law to establish principled
123
Granted, the standard of review required the court to view the facts in the
light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 920 (holding that a jury could find the
victim might have survived up to six minutes). Still, when the overbreadth of the
HAC aggravator combines with great deference to jury determinations, the
aggravator becomes truly meaningless.
124
Brown v. State, 753 P.2d 908, 913 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 910.
127
Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 919.
128
See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980) (discussing the jury’s
interpretation of the “outrageously wanton” standard).
129
See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
130
See, e.g., Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 920–21.
131
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976) (“[A] trial judge is more
experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose
sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.”).
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distinctions to guide them in capital sentencing decisions.132
Unfortunately, as the dissent in Pavatt observed, “Oklahoma has
veered off the course forced on it by Cartwright, coming full circle
and no longer limiting this clearly vague aggravating
circumstance in a manner that minimizes ‘the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.’ ”133
III. LEGISLATURES MUST REFINE HAC AGGRAVATORS TO
SENSIBLY DISTINGUISH MURDERS THAT DO AND DO NOT JUSTIFY
THE DEATH SENTENCE
The OCCA has strayed from Maynard’s mandate because
courts are susceptible to creating unworkable standards that fail
to reflect the community’s judgments on retribution.134 Whereas
the legislature would have to debate how to refine the HAC
aggravator, the OCCA simply adopted the torture prerequisite in
one decision.135 Moreover, courts can create piecemeal rule
additions and alterations on a case-by-case basis, which is
exactly what the OCCA did in weakening the torture standard
over time.136 Here, the court created an irrational standard
because it hastily applied a stopgap to save Oklahoma’s HAC
aggravator and attempted to backtrack into a more broadly
applicable standard.137 Now, the courts should obligate state
lawmakers to perform their legislative responsibility to craft an
adequate HAC aggravator.
A.

Critics are incorrect to point to the failure of court-made
limiting constructions as conclusive proof that states cannot
create constitutional HAC aggravators.

It is not surprising that the OCCA chose to unravel its
bright-line limiting construction of the HAC aggravator over
time. The Court adopted the torture narrowing construction
because the Supreme Court signaled such an interpretation
would allow Oklahoma to preserve jury discretion in capital
132

DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 79, at 98.
Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 936–37 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
134
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (“Courts are not representative
bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.” (quoting
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
135
Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1468 (10th Cir. 1995).
136
See DeRosa v. State, 89 P.3d 1124, 1156 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004).
137
See Pavatt, 928 F.3d at 936–37 (Hartz, J., dissenting) (noting the torture
limiting construction was “forced on” the OCCA and that the standard has since
come “full circle”).
133
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sentencing.138 Yet, the state did not seem to want to limit the
aggravator to just torture killings.
Granted, the torture
requirement undercuts the purpose of the HAC aggravator, since
it is a gap-filling factor. Specifically, the aggravator allows jurors
to make holistic, individualized determinations about whether a
specific murder justifies special retribution because of
exceptional circumstances that the legislature did not foresee.139
But, ironically, the OCCA also undermined the purpose of the
HAC aggravator when it allowed the factor to apply to any
person guilty of murder.140
If Oklahoma wants to give jurors more discretion than a
torture requirement might, the state should craft a standard that
balances the value of the sentencer’s particularized consideration
and the risk of unfettered jury discretion. Instead, the court
rashly adopted a single-factor HAC aggravator, was unsatisfied
with the limits of the saving construction, and then
incrementally “refined” it into a meaningless, sweeping standard.
To address the unconstitutional overbreadth of the HAC
aggravator, the legislature must craft a standard that comports
with the plain language and purpose of the especially heinous
aggravator.141
Because Oklahoma is just one of many states that
unreasonably defines and applies its HAC aggravator, some
scholars have argued that HAC aggravators are per se
unconstitutional.142 Generally, people who oppose the HAC
aggravating circumstance argue that the legislatures—or
courts—could never craft a standard narrow enough to
adequately mitigate the risk of arbitrary enforcement of capital
punishment.143
Consequently, legislatures should simply
enumerate every circumstance that qualifies a murder for capital

138

Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 365 (1988).
See Welner et al., supra note 6, at 3 (arguing that HAC aggravators are
limited in their ability to judge “the worst of the worst” crimes because statutory
language covers only a subset of factors and characteristics relevant to murder
investigations).
140
Id.
141
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983) (“[T]he aggravating circumstance
merely performs the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of
murder who are eligible for the death penalty.”).
142
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO
MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 420 (2002).
143
See Rosen, supra note 20, at 989–92.
139
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punishment.144 Because people cannot help but base sentencing
decisions on their subjective judgments, the HAC aggravator can
never work as the legislature intended.145 These critics recognize
that juries exist to weigh the evidence and apply the law to
individual cases.146 However, they argue that, because “death is
different,” the law can trust sentencers to apply only strictly
defined aggravators in capital sentencing decisions.147 This
position is difficult to square with this country’s reverence for the
right of criminal defendants’ to their peers’ individualized
assessment of the cases and determination of guilt.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial reflects our
nation’s democratic belief that the accused’s peers are best suited
to determine whether the defendant’s conduct warrants
punishment.148 In many states, the legislature has included an
especially heinous aggravator to reflect that same principle.149
Apparently, the legislature believes that the trier of fact is in the
best position to judge the severity of a defendant’s conduct when
it does not fit one of the specified aggravators.150 This decision is
logical since the death penalty is reserved for crimes that society
considers truly debased,151 and juries are generally a microcosm
of the community.152 Furthermore, as a matter of constitutional
law, it seems appropriate for the legislature to allow
individualized sentencing decisions.153 However, the legislature’s
judgment must be balanced against the right of the accused
against arbitrary and capricious sentencing.154 Consequently, the
144

Id. (rejecting the HAC aggravator and suggesting a torture aggravating
circumstance).
145
Id. See Simone Unwalla, Death is Different. Death Sentencing is Not., 14 PA.
J. PHIL., POL., & ECON. 41, 45 (2019).
146
Unwalla, supra note 145, at 45.
147
See id. at 45–46; Rosen, supra note 20, at 989–92.
148
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
149
See Unwalla, supra note 145, at 45.
150
Welner et al., supra note 6, at 3 (noting legislative guidance should reflect
that “murder is a very diverse crime with a range of motives, techniques, actions,
intervening influences, victims and their characteristics, and the reactions of a
perpetrator to one’s homicidal actions”).
151
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977).
152
Ring, 536 U.S. at 615-16 (2002).
153
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 428 (1980).
154
See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the
Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L., 117, 158 (2004) (arguing that the
representative nature of the jury lends “legitimacy” to capital sentencing, but “not
necessarily justice”).
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legislature must ensure that HAC aggravators function as
intended: to reach only especially morally bankrupt defendants.
While critics are right to point out that there is a
fundamental flaw with HAC aggravators as states currently
define and apply them,155 they are likely incorrect that the flaw is
fatal. Juries can make principled determinations given sufficient
direction. The issue with the HAC aggravator is that, naturally,
most people have no way of knowing how to compare murders
without meaningful guidance.156 To remedy this, legislatures can
likely craft standards that subtly cue jurors into what
differentiates the common from the truly anomalous murder
motives and perpetrator profiles.157
This guidance would
simultaneously prevent the HAC aggravator from acting as a
standardless catch-all and allow individualized determinations
about the defendant’s fate.
B. States can craft standards that cue jurors into the
circumstances that cause society to judge certain murders
more harshly than others.
To strike the proper balance for jury discretion, HAC
aggravators should have a few basic characteristics. First, the
legislature should generally reserve descriptive words as a tool to
modify more concrete words. As long as the concrete words
objectively measure a quality or condition, the qualifying
descriptive words will enhance the standard’s meaning. Second,
the statute should define any word that may be open to a juror’s
subjective interpretation. Third, legislatures should consider
adding a mens rea element where the jury could otherwise
construe the language to cover the average murder.158 Fourth,
the statute should contain ample action words. Last, concrete
words should cue jurors into qualities, traits, motivations, or
mental states that are generally lacking in a typical murder
case.159 HAC aggravators that follow this formula might better
facilitate individualized jury determinations about the

155

Rosen, supra note 20, at 992.
Welner et al., supra note 6, at 3, 9.
157
Id. at 3. (“There are numerous aspects of intent, actions, victim choice, and
attitudes about one’s offense that distinguish a crime.”).
158
For example, a “torture” standard requiring that the defendant actually
intended to cause the victim some level of pain might help jurors in Oklahoma
separate classes of murder. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
159
Welner et al., supra note 6, at 3, 9.
156
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defendant’s fate while providing principled guidance to help
juries compare the circumstances of the specific case to other
murders.
A few states have crafted especially heinous aggravating
statutes that follow some of these drafting principles and could
serve as prototypes to create more workable models in states like
Oklahoma. For example, New York’s “especially cruel and
wanton” standard, while moot, would provide much more
guidance than Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator.160 Here, the statute
required not only that “the defendant acted in an especially cruel
and wanton manner,”161 but also that the defendant did so
“pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting
torture upon the victim prior to the victim’s death.”162 Unlike
Oklahoma’s definition of torture, New York defines torture as
“the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical
pain.”163
While “extreme physical pain” is analogous to “great physical
anguish,” two things set New York’s torture standard apart.
First, there is no prerequisite—like conscious physical
suffering—to undercut this definition; rather, the definition of
“depraved” clarifies and further narrows the application of the
HAC aggravator.164 “Depraved” means the defendant enjoyed
inflicting the extreme physical pain.165 Thus, this depravity
standard separates sadistic defendants from defendants who
intended to hurt the victim but did so with a different, perhaps
less perverted, conscious object.166 Here, since it is probably

160
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x) (McKinney 2019). New York’s death
penalty statute was invalidated by the New York Court of Appeals in 2004. N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney 2020), invalidated by People v. LaValle, 3
N.Y.3d 88 (2004).
161
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)(a)(x). Notably, the conduct must be “cruel” and
“wanton,” whereas courts have interpreted HAC aggravators in the disjunctive. Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. This aggravator is arguably redundant because the defendant must
“intend[ ]” to inflict torture, and “torture” is also defined as an “intentional” act. Id.
Yet, this redundancy serves a useful function because it highlights to the jury that
they must focus on the defendant’s mental state. Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. (“ ‘[D]epraved’ means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme
physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the
defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical
pain . . . .”).
166
For example, a defendant who uses a kitchen knife during a heated argument
and stabs a victim to death likely intends to cause great pain. Yet, the enraged
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rational to impart greater culpability on murderers who take
pleasure in seeing their victims suffer, or even kill for sport, New
York’s “depraved” standard provides a principled distinction
between murders. Second, the “intentional” and “depraved”
requirements focus the definition of torture on the defendant’s
conduct.167 Thus, this prong is less likely to turn on chance
factors, like the sharpshooter bonus.
Colorado briefly employed an “especially heinous, cruel, or
depraved” standard168 that resembles aspects of New York’s and
Oklahoma’s aggravating circumstances, but arguably better
balances specificity and flexibility.169 Actually, Colorado and
Oklahoma’s definitions of “cruel” are similar.170 The main
difference between the two standards is that the Colorado
definition requires “physical or psychological torture.”171 Under
its plain meaning, “conscious physical suffering” does not satisfy
this standard, which should prevent Oklahoma’s misguided focus
on whether the victim died instantaneously.172
While an
explicitly intent-based torture standard—like New York’s—might
provide clearer guidance, this torture standard could provide a
stronger framework for Oklahoma than its current HAC
aggravator.
defendant does not necessarily enjoy inflicting that pain if the defendant’s sole
motive in executing the killing was rage.
167
See § 125.27(1)(a)(x).
168
See People v. Rodriguez 794 P.2d 965, 983 n.14 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). The
legislature reverted this aggravating circumstance to a pure “especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved” aggravator after the Supreme Court of Colorado declared it
unconstitutional for unrelated reasons. People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 846 (Colo.
1991) (en banc). Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1990) (repealed
2002), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (5)(j). Then, in 2020, Colorado voted to
abolish the death penalty. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(1)(b).
169
People v. Rodriguez 794 P.2d 965, 983 n.14 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (citing
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 1990) (repealed 2002)).
170
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (suggesting Oklahoma’s definition
of “cruel” might be adequate if the HAC aggravator did not apply in the disjunctive).
171
Rodriguez, 794 P.2d at 983 n.14 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103
(West 1990) (repealed 2002)). Granted, the instruction goes on to state “torture”
includes “the pitiless infliction of pain or suffering,” which could unduly weaken the
standard. Id. Still, unlike Oklahoma’s limiting construction, the definitions do not
instruct the jury that non-instantaneous death is enough. Id.
172
Id.; Battenfield v. State, 816 P.2d 555, 565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). Because
the Oklahoma courts use their explanation of the word “torture” as a blanket
authorization to find the HAC aggravating circumstance whenever that minimum
bar is met, their instructions water down the standard. Id. If Oklahoma wants to
clarify what does not qualify as torture, the definition could begin with: “Torture
does not refer to the physical suffering the defendant inflicted to accomplish the
killing . . . .”
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Colorado’s definition of “depraved” is even more effective
because it spells out motives for murder that society judges
especially harshly.
For example, “depraved” means either
“senseless or committed without purpose or meaning,” or
committed for an atypical reason.173 Explicitly, the aggravator
excludes murders that are “the product of greed, envy, revenge,
or another of those emotions ordinarily associated with
murder . . . .”174 Moreover, “depraved” murders are those that
“served no purpose for the defendant beyond his pleasure of
killing.”175 This standard is flexible since it allows jurors to
evaluate the defendant’s conduct, but it also focuses the jurors on
which specific circumstances they must find to impose the death
penalty under the “depraved” option. Thus, this standard strikes
the balance Maynard mandated.
Lastly, the definition of “heinous” wisely requires the jury to
evaluate the “method of killing” and the victim’s
vulnerabilities.176 Specifically, jurors can only find a murder
especially heinous if they agree the method of killing was
“particularly shocking or brutal” or if the victim was “unable to
physically defend himself because of physical or mental disability
or because he is too old or too young.”177 Therefore, this prong
also focuses the jury on factors that are rationally related to the
defendant’s culpability rather than allowing the jury to rely on
any circumstance it finds particularly shocking.
These are just two examples of statutes that direct juries to
the factors surrounding a crime that bear on society’s judgment
about the defendant’s level of depravity. Unlike Oklahoma’s
current standard, which singled out the victim’s perspective in
defining heinousness, these aggravating circumstances attempt
to reach the defendant’s motivation and underlying character.
Here, the legislature has assessed what makes one murder more
deserving of punishment than another and has put forward
flexible, but rational, distinctions. In turn, jurors would have the
discretion to decide whether the defendant’s conduct met one of
the required criteria. Indeed, when jurors make informed
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determinations about whether the defendant’s conduct was
especially heinous, Furman’s mandate is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
For too long, states have ignored the fundamental flaws with
HAC aggravators as they currently apply. Rather than allowing
the legislature to do its job—to strike a balance between
flexibility and precision in criminal statutes—the courts have illadvisedly adopted clumsy narrowing constructions. Seemingly,
after Oklahoma adopted the torture limiting construction, the
courts realized they erred in substituting the legislature’s
attempt to cover the worst crimes with a standard that reaches
only one subclass of especially heinous murders. To backtrack,
the OCCA ironically broadened its limiting construction. In
doing so, the state has shielded its eyes from the mandates of
Furman and its progeny.
Without legislative reform, HAC aggravators will not achieve
their chief duties of adequately channeling jury discretion and
allowing individualized determinations about whether a murder
is particularly deserving of the death penalty. As the state’s
representative body, legislatures can use their experience and
commonsense principles to craft aggravators that allow jurors to
rationally scrutinize the circumstances surrounding a murder
that reflect the collective conscience. In fact, as Supreme Court
precedent makes clear, the Eight Amendment obligates the
legislature to do just that.178
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